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Abstract 
We test risk attitude and risk propensity of executive and non-executive directors of almost all 
(read: 10) companies listed at the Suriname Stock Exchange. This stock exchange associates with 
an emerging market, which currently seems to be at its initial stage. With a personalized survey 
we collect data for 13 members in the board room. The sample size is small as the population is 
small, but still we can test various hypotheses that are put forward in the literature. Our main 
finding is that the differences between risk attitudes of board members of companies in a 
developing country do not differ tremendously from those of board members in developed 
countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The decisions of the members of the board of a company have a strong effect on the performance 
of a company. Members like the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO), and also members of supervisory boards exercise impact on the total performance of a 
company. This corresponds with the upper echelons perspective which argues that company 
performance is a reflection of its top managers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Various aspects of 
(supervisory) board membership are the focus of many recent studies, where bonuses, incentives 
and for example risk attitudes attract much attention. Furthermore, key stakeholders now require 
from companies in all sectors to clearly express the degree of their willingness to take risk. In the 
present study we also consider risk attitudes, where we specifically focus on board members of 
companies in a developing and emerging economy. Indeed, most if not all research focuses on 
westernized companies, also as the relevant data are perhaps more easily available. In our present 
study we encounter data issues, as we can only interview 13 board members, simply as there are 
not that many more, but then still, we examine their risk attitudes and are able to highlight a few 
noticeable outcomes. As far as we know, this is the first ever study that measures risk attitudes of 
leading directors in a developing economy.  
 Board room behavior and dynamics in the inner process of the board room has been the 
subject of much recent research (see for example de Groot et al. 2012 and their list of references, 
Herrmann and Datta 2005, Jensen and Zajac 2004, amongst many others). In companies there are 
a multitude of factors such as characteristics of individuals, roles and organizational situations 
which all can influence decision making of top executives. In addition, essential for executives 
performance is the responsibility to undertake investments with which risk is associated. These 
elements of decision making, together with various industrial and environmental factors, result in 
a company’s performance (Hambrick, 2007).  
Many authors use demographic characteristics of top executives as proxies for their 
knowledge base, cognitive orientation and risk attitudes. These proxies are used to explain (or 
correlate with) the strategic choices of executives, performance levels or any stock exchange 
outcome. A great deal of the empirical literature on executive demographic characteristics, 
(strategic) decision-making and company performance has been grounded in the upper echelons 
theory advocated by Hambrick and Mason (1984). Hambrick and Mason (1984) indicate that 
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demographic traits such as gender, age, educational level and functional background experiences 
shape the values and beliefs of top executives and can be seen as legitimate proxies for underlying 
cognitive abilities, knowledge and values and which, in turn, impact behavior and (strategic) 
decision-making. Whereas the upper echelons theory accentuates the role of demography-based 
preferences, the agency theory emphasizes the role of position-based preferences (Jensen and 
Zajac, 2004). Thus, according to the agency theory, the role in the board also has an impact on 
decision making of top executives. We investigate both demography and professional role in our 
study. 
Adams et al. (2010) imply that much of the literature on board characteristics is directed 
towards Anglo-American companies and hence studies on boards in non-Anglo-American 
companies have been underexplored. Setiyono and Tarazi (2004) argue that only few companies 
from the latter type of companies provide information on board members to the public. For our 
study, we decided to interview various board members of key Surinamese companies as we believe 
it is interesting to analyze the risk attitudes of boardroom members of the Surinamese companies 
who are listed on the Suriname Stock Exchange (SSE). Furthermore, Suriname has a two-tier board 
system which is known as a system with an insider managerial board (executive directors) and an 
outsider supervisory board (non-executive directors). In addition, while most studies of 
companies’ executives and decision making have tended to focus either on the CEO or CFO 
(executive directors), we extend the arguments to include non-executive directors (NED). Hence, 
in this paper we study the influence of various characteristics, like age, functional experience, 
professional role, over(confidence) of executive and non-executive directors, and the way they 
operate in a two-tier board, on their risk attitude in the decision making process.  
We use a survey-based approach (executed as a structured interview) to provide insight 
into the people behind the decisions taken in the companies listed at the SSE. The Surinamese 
context in the sense of cultural differences influences the way people engage in doing business, 
thus offering an opportunity to enhance our understanding of the risk attitudes of top executives in 
an emerging economy. We utilize the survey proposed by de Groot et al. (2012) and adapt it to the 
Surinamese situation. Our survey harvests information of various characteristics (demographic, 
personality and company), information related to the role the respondent has in the boardroom and 
information regarding investment decisions. During the interview, tailor made investment 
scenarios are presented to the respondents. This approach differs from de Groot et al. (2012), who 
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use a dynamic web-page to tailor each survey to the respondent, thereby automating certain aspects 
of the structured interview. However, with the limited number of respondents but also the limited 
responses on the investment scenarios, we are not able to analyze the scenarios in detail. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the relevant 
theory and research hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data collection and in Section 4 we present 
the results of our analyses. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the main findings and their 
implications. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
To guide our empirical analysis we first review available theory and from that we generate a few 
hypotheses.  
The explicit acknowledgement of risk when running companies has been significant in 
recent years as the consequences of risky decisions have become more noticeable (Sitkin and 
Pablo, 1992). Decision making under risk is an essential part of the job of top executives and it 
implies that their decisions affect their companies and environment. An individual’s personal 
experience or beliefs about risk has an impact on the view how a decision maker assesses and 
reacts to risk, which is usually labeled as risk attitude. The general tendency of the decision maker 
to take or to avoid risk is referred to by Sitkin and Pablo (1992) as the decision maker’s risk 
propensity and is according to Papadakis and Barwise (2002) the most widely used CEO 
characteristic. One way to measure this propensity is presented by MacCrimmon and Wehrung 
(1990) as a measure of willingness to take risk. Various characteristics (both demographic and 
personality characteristics) can be viewed as a signal for an executives’ risk propensity or 
willingness to take risk. In addition, an individual’s risk tolerance i.e. the amount of risk an 
individual is comfortably willing to take , is also important when analyzing risk attitudes. 
Much empirical literature on executive demographic traits and organizational outcomes 
has been grounded in the upper echelon theory of Hambrick and Mason (1984). The theory states 
that organizational outcomes, that is, strategic choices and company performance, can be partially 
predicted from executives’ observable (demographic) characteristics such as age, education, and 
functional background experiences. Furthermore, most upper echelon studies are related to chief 
executive characteristics (CEO) as a result of the power he/she possesses in most companies 
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(Hambrick and Mason 1984, Herrmann and Datta 2005). However, executive and non-executive 
directors are part of each other’s decision context (Jensen and Zajac, 2004), and therefore when 
examining top level decision making it makes sense to study the decision processes of all the 
members of a board. Graham et al. (2013) explain that CEOs and CFOs have different personal 
characteristics and career paths and they also differ in terms of attitudes and this has an effect on 
decision making. Ultimately, it is the board of directors consisting of executive and non-executive 
directors who determines how to allocate resources, that is, to participate in (risky) investments 
and this in turn depends on their risk attitude and the willingness to take risk. 
Therefore, in our study we also will use demographic characteristics, which in our case 
will be age and functional background as proxies for risk attitudes of board members (executive 
and non-executive directors). 
 
Age 
Age can be considered as both a proxy for an individual’s risk propensity and for the extent of 
experience (Dohmen et al., 2011, Herrmann and Datta, 2005). An executive’s age can influence 
decisions or choices in important ways. Age has been found to be negatively related with regard 
to the capability to incorporate new information and to make risky decisions (Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992). According to de Groot et al. (2012), the negative relationship between age and the 
willingness to take risk has widely been recognized. Younger CEOs may be less risk averse, while 
older executives shall be more concerned about career and financial security and consequently be 
more inclined to avoid riskier projects (Graham et al., 2013, Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
However, age can also reflect experience and a different outlook, allowing executives to take more 
risks (Graham et al., 2013). In addition, experience could make executives less cautious to the risks 
underlying the individual decisions. Thus, we stipulate  
 
Hypothesis 1 
Younger executives are more willing to take risk. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2  
More experienced executives are more willing to take risk.  
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Functional background experience 
According to Jensen and Zajac (2004), functional background experience has extensively been 
referred to as the demographic characteristic to influence company performance. Hence, in our 
study the emphasis is on finding a relationship between functional background experience and the 
risk attitude of top executives. Each executive has specific experience in some functional field and 
this may shape decision making. The functional background experience, like accounting, finance, 
legal, or marketing/sales, is found to have a direct impact on the way business problems are 
determined, on how information is processed, and on how strategic preferences are made by 
executives (Jensen and Zajac, 2004). Within a group of executives with different functional 
backgrounds each of them will approach and analyze a problem to a large extent in terms of the 
objectives and activities of their own respective domains (Dearborn and Simon, 1958). In addition, 
functional background experience may serve as an indicator for an individual’s risk propensity. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) classify functional backgrounds in marketing/ sales, product R&D 
and entrepreneurship as so-called ‘output’ backgrounds and backgrounds in production, 
accounting/ finance and process R&D as ‘throughput’ backgrounds. Individuals operating within 
these areas are likely to have different perspectives on the company and its environment. To assess 
the type of functional background depends on the contextual relation purporting that output 
backgrounds are related to contexts characterized by greater uncertainty and ambiguity (Herrmann 
and Datta, 2005). Jensen and Zajac (2004) document that firms led by executives with functional 
background experiences in finance are more likely to pursue growth through acquisitions and 
diversification. This leads us to put forward the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3.1-3.3 
Executives with output backgrounds are more willing to take risk. 
Executives with output backgrounds are more likely to engage in R&D investments. 
Executives with output backgrounds are more likely to engage in investments related to expansion 
into new markets. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Firms with more finance executives are more likely to engage in acquisition investment activities. 
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Role-dependent risk attitudes 
As opposed to upper echelons theory with its demographically based preferences, agency theory 
focuses on the different governance positions of top executives. The emphasis here is on the 
positions that top executives have on boards, that is, whether they are executive (inside) directors 
(CEO, CFO), or non-executive (outside) directors. Agency theory addresses the potential conflicts 
of interests between executive and non-executive directors thus leading to discussions of how their 
views differ as a consequence of the different roles they occupy. Therefore, it is relevant to account 
for the (professional) roles that executives have in the boardroom as a determinant of risk attitude. 
According to de Groot et al. (2012), if risk taking is an important principle of a company, and the 
board as a group decides on the risks to be taken, individual differences in the perceptions of 
executives in their willingness to take risks are essential determinants of boardroom dynamics.  
A company’s board serves various professional roles and tasks and these are distributed 
amongst members based on their expertise, functional background experience and risk propensity, 
amongst potentially other aspects. Agency theory states that an individual’s professional role in a 
company can influence decision making because of differences in outlook and operation of the 
different roles played within the board as well as differences in information levels (Gillete et al., 
2008). Non-executive directors (NEDs) for example have a supervisory role in the board. As 
decision makers they may be more cautious than executive directors, where the potential presence 
of information asymmetry could be an explanation for this behavior.  
In addition, Jensen and Zajac (2004), aim to show in their study that top executives 
(executives and non-executive directors) who are demographically identical but occupy different 
roles are not necessarily related to the same strategic choices, neither are executives who are 
demographically different but occupy a similar role.  
Taken this all together generates the following hypothesis: 
 
 
Hypothesis 5 
Executives  for who the professional role and functional background experience match (are more 
consistent) are less risk averse and associate with more investment decisions than executives 
without this match.  
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(Over-) confidence 
“Overconfidence is an important driver of individual choice behavior” (Griffin and Tversky, 1992) 
and “individuals who are overconfident put too much confidence in outcomes they believe are 
under their control” (March and Shapira, 1987). Particularly, top executives are presumed to 
possess such a personality characteristic (Hackbarth, 2008). According to de Groot et al. (2012) 
and Hackbarth (2008), (over-) confidence can influence decision taking and has an effect on risk 
taking. Consequently, it is important to understand how this characteristic affects companies’ 
performance and therefore influences shareholder welfare. Malmendier and Tate (2005) recognize 
some traits of top executives that are related to company performance and emphasize the 
importance of (over-) confidence for companies’ investments.  
Goel and Thakor (2008) argue that top executives are expected to be overconfident because 
their success is based on past performance, which is in the end related to the risk they take. This 
suggests that overconfident executives are more willing to take risk. In addition, individuals that 
rank themselves higher with regard to their willingness to take risk, have a higher risk tolerance 
(Dohmen et al., 2011). 
Ben-David et al. (2007) argue that investment projects are perceived with less risk by an 
overconfident manager, and also that such a manager assesses these projects with a low discount 
rate. Therefore, in comparison to a less confident manager, more projects will be perceived to have 
positive net present value. Hence, an overconfident manager will invest more. This leads us to 
postulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 6 
More confident  executives  are more willing to take risk and they also ignite more investments. 
 
Company characteristics 
Graham et al. (2013) document that there are various relationships between CEO characteristics 
and company characteristics. For example, male CEOs relative to female CEOs are more likely to 
have higher debt ratios and in particular higher short-term debt ratios. Subsequently, more debt 
generates more risk and higher expected returns, and this is a preference that might be related to 
executive personal characteristics. Some theories, like those outlined in Heaton (2002) and 
Hackbarth (2008) indicate that managers’ behavioral traits influence the use of debt in companies. 
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Furthermore, Sung and Hanna (1996) identify various financial variables such as debt which are 
related to risk tolerance and indicate that debt is positively related to risk tolerance. This brings us 
to our final hypothesis, which reads as 
 
Hypothesis 7 
The larger is an executive’s risk tolerance, the more willing this executive is to use debt. 
 
In the next section we discuss the data collection, and in the subsequent section we present the 
empirical results for the above hypotheses. 
 
3. Data  
 
We collected data using a survey to analyze the risk attitudes of the board members of the 
companies listed at the Suriname Stock Exchange. We used the survey proposed by de Groot et 
al. (2012) and adapted it to the Surinamese situation. De Groot et al. (2012) used a dynamic website 
to tailor the survey questions to individual responses, but we executed the survey as a structured 
interview in order to tailor the investment scenarios to the individual situations of the respondents. 
The survey was pre-tested on individuals with boardroom experience. Once their responses 
indicated that the questions were clear, we proceeded to send the survey to the respondents. 
 
Respondents 
The individuals in our survey work as board members for ten companies listed on the Suriname 
Stock Exchange (SSE). The survey was sent to both the executive and non-executive directors of 
these companies where their names were obtained from the companies’ annual reports. As 
Suriname is a small country in terms of population and companies, it became apparent that certain 
respondents were holding more than one executive post in more than one firm. The solution for 
this situation is that these respondents had to complete the survey only once in the capacity of their 
main position. 
The survey, accompanied with an invitation letter, was first sent to the CEOs of the ten 
listed companies requesting their participation and also their approval to send the survey to the 
CFOs and the NEDs of the respective companies. In the letter is explicitly declared that the 
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obtained information will be dealt with in confidence. The need to collect sufficient responses, 
created time between the survey/ interviews and the feedback. Nevertheless, we received a limited 
number of responses, that is, 13 full surveys. This is a small sample, but we should stress that the 
population is small too. Taking account of cross positions, 13 respondents amount to about 50% 
of the relevant board members of stock exchange listed firms in Suriname.  
 
Questions 
The purpose of our study is to identify a relation between various characteristics of top executives 
and their attitudes towards risk in the decision making process. Hence, we gather information on 
gender, age, functional experience and role within the company. In addition, we gain information 
on a number of company characteristics (company sector, number of employees and size of the 
company revenues). Subsequently, we ask the respondents to what extent in the last fifteen years 
they were involved in investment decisions and the typical size of these certain investments. With 
investments we mean new market expansion, expansion of production capacity, innovation or 
R&D projects, IT projects and acquisitions and mergers) they have decided on in the last fifteen 
years. 
 Our sample consists of 12 men and 1 woman. The minimum age is 42, maximum is 69 and 
the average age is 54 years. 9 of the 13 are a NED, while 4 are either CEO or CFO. The sectors 
that are represented in our sample are 2 in production, 3 in the hospitality sector (hotels and 
restaurants) and 8 in the financial sector (banking and investment). 2 of the interviewed board 
members are associated with a firm with an annual turnover of less than 50Mio SRD (Surinamese 
Dollar is about 0.3 USD), 3 are concerned with a turnover in between 50Mio and 100Mio SRD, 
and 8 of them deal with an annual turnover in between 101Mio and 500Mio SRD. In our analysis 
below we will code these outcomes as 25, 75 and 300, which are the middle values of these three 
categories. The minimum number of employees is 57, the maximum is 431, while on average the 
firms have 272 employees.   
 When we analyze our data we will treat all our 13 respondents as executives. 
 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
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Table 1 gives the responses to question on investment decisions in the last 15 years, and it 
is clear there is quite some dispersion. The same holds for the results in Table 2 where we report 
on the question of which percentage of the annual turnover is usually spent on which decisions. 
Both tables tell us that even though the sample size is small, there is substantial variation in the 
data.  
 To measure risk attitude we ask the respondents to make an assessment of their willingness 
to take risk in general and in their professional role on an eleven point scale. According to Dohmen 
et al. (2009) this measure is used to examine heterogeneity and aspects of risk attitudes of the top 
executives. Using the same scale, the respondents are asked to rank the average CEO, CFO and 
non-executive director in their willingness to take risks. 
 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
 
 Table 3 shows that there is substantial variation in the self-reported values on own risk 
attitude. Also, the average value of the judgment about the own risk attitude in general is slightly 
higher than that of the judgment given the position that one has within the firm.  
Table 4 gives the frequency of answers to three statements on the risk attitude of three types 
of board members. Clearly, a CEO is believed to be more willing to take risk than a CFO or NED, 
which corroborates with the results in De Groot et al (2012), who could interview a much larger 
sample of individuals.  
 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
 
Finally, respondents are asked to assess four types of investment scenarios with different 
investment possibilities originating from the answers they have given to the question on their 
company’s annual revenues. Each respondent obtained four investment scenarios with two varying 
parameters, that is, the size of the initial investment that is lost in case of the investment fails, 
varying for each respondent between 30% to 60% of their specific company’s annual revenues, 
and the probability of success, which also varies for each respondent between 70% and 95% for 
each investment scenario. The scenarios are presented in Table 5 and the parameter setting as well 
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as the answers are presented in Table 6. There are a few missing observations here, but still we 
can use some of the outcomes in our analysis, as we will indicate in the next section.  
 
4. Results 
 
This section contains the correlations and regression model outcomes for the data presented in the 
various tables. Of course, the sample size is small, as we have data on only 13 board members, but 
then still, we aim to falsify the hypotheses in Section 2.  
 The first hypothesis H1 predicts that younger executives are more willing to take risk. To 
examine this hypothesis we regress the answers to the two questions in Table 3 on a constant and 
the variable “age”. With White-corrected standard errors we get the parameter estimates -0.085 
and t-statistic -1.903 (p value is 0.084) and -0.095 with t-statistic -1.532 (p value is 0.154), 
respectively, both for 13 observations. So, there is some evidence that older executives are less 
willing to take risk, and hence we obtain moderate support for hypothesis 1.  
 The second hypothesis H2 predicts that the more experience companies’ executives have, 
the more willing they are to take risk. We base experience on the answers to the questions displayed 
in Table 1. We coded “Never” as 0, 1-5 is coded as 3, 5-10 is coded as 7.5, 10-15 is coded as 12.5 
and more than 15 is coded as 20. Next, we sum the answers to the 5 categories and call this variable 
“experience”. A regression of the answers to two questions in Table 1 on a constant and this 
“experience” variable gives an estimated parameter of -0.025 (White corrected t statistic -1.768 
and p value 0.108) and -0.026 (t statistic -2.350 and p value 0.071). These results imply that more 
experience leads to a smaller willingness to take risk. Hence, hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
The third hypothesis deals with the effect of output background. 2 of the 13 respondents 
have such an output function. We now regress the two variables with the answers to the questions 
in Table 3 on a constant and a 1-0 dummy for the output function, and obtain t statistics equal to -
1.382 and -0.107. A similar exercise is done for the answers to the questions in the third and first 
rows of Tables 1 and 2. For the R&D investments questions we obtain a (white-corrected) t statistic 
of 2.408 and 1.236, respectively. And for the question on market expansions we obtain t statistics 
with values -0.721 and 1.316. In sum, we do find support for the second item of Hypothesis 3, and 
can conclude that executives with output backgrounds are more likely to engage in R&D 
investments.  
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The fourth hypothesis posits that companies with more finance executives are more likely 
to engage in acquisition investment activities. 8 respondents indicate to be active in the financial 
sector, and 5 in either industrial production or hotels/restaurants. We create a dummy variable 
“financial sector” which is 1 for the financial sector and 0 otherwise. The answers to the five 
questions in Table 2 are coded as “not relevant” is coded as 0, 0-1% as 0.5, 2%, 3%, 4% as 2, 3, 
4, 5-10% as 7.5 and 11-20 % as 15.5. A regression of the answers to the last question in Table 1 
on a constant and the financial sector dummy yields an estimated parameter 2.025 (with White 
corrected t statistic 2.905 and associated p value 0.014), whereas a regression of the answers to the 
last question in Table 2 gives an estimate of 3.376 (t statistic 1.467 and p value 0.176). So, there 
indeed seems evidence that finance executives are more likely to engage in acquisition activities.  
Hypothesis 5 we predict that the more consistent an executive’s professional role and 
functional background experience are, the higher the risk tolerance, the more investment decisions. 
We define the consistency of the role and the functional experience as the sum of the answers to 
the questions in Table 1. The investment decisions are the answers to the questions in Table 2. 
Regressing the answers to each of the questions in Table 2 on the “consistency” variable, we get 
the estimates 0.041 (with White t statistic’s p value of 0.421), -0.004 (0.896), 0.029 (0.212), 0.039 
(0.001), and 0.012 (0.579), respectively. Hence, only in the case of investments in IT projects (the 
fourth question) we find that more consistency leads to more investment decisions. So, for IT 
projects we find support for this hypothesis, and for all other investments we do not find such 
support. 
 Hypothesis 6 states that more confident executives are more willing to take risk and they 
also ignite more investments. When we regress the answers to the questions in Tables 1 and 2 on 
a constant and the two answers to the questions in Table 3, we get nine insignificant regression 
models (with p values of the joint F test all much larger than 0.05) except for the case of R&D 
projects in Table 2. There the p value is 0.049. The key significant parameter associates with the 
second question in Table 3, and hence we can conclude that when board members indicate that 
they are willing to take risk given their position in the firm, that then the percentage that the firm 
invests in R&D is larger.  
 Finally, the seventh hypothesis predicts that the higher an executive’s risk tolerance, the 
more willing he or she is to use debt. For each of the four scenarios, we create the following 
variables. The answers to the question on annual turnover are coded as 25Mio SRD for answer 
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category 1, 75Mio SRD for category 2 and 300 Mio SRD for category 3. Then we divide the size 
of the investment for each of the scenarios by these amounts. Next, we multiply the probability of 
success of the project with this outcome, and finally we multiply this with the statement on the 
riskiness of the project, given the probability of success, and its size relative to the firm’s turnover. 
We take this new variable as a measure of a larger willingness to accept a risky project. Using a 
four-equation regression model where the “willingness” is on the left-hand side and the answers 
to the first question in Table 3 is on the right-hand side, we obtain a pooled parameter estimate 
equal to 9.184 with t statistic 1.698 and p value 0.099. For the second question in Table 3, using 
the same type of model, we obtain a parameter estimate equal to 6.107 with t statistic 1.176 and p 
value 0.248. So, we seem have some mild evidence in support of H7.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the risk attitudes of board members of 10 companies in a developing 
country. The sample of respondents is small, but this is also due the fact that the size of the 
population is small. As far as we know, this is the first ever study on such risk attitudes for a 
developing country. 
 Our hypotheses were all constructed from the literature on risk attitudes where the data 
were always collected for western industrialized countries. Most likely due to the small sample 
size we could not find much evidence for various hypotheses, but still various hypotheses did 
receive support.  
 To summarize, we find for this developing country and their firms that there is some 
evidence that younger executives are more willing to take risk and that executives with output 
backgrounds are more likely to engage in R&D investments. Also, we document that finance 
executives are more likely to engage in acquisition activities, and for IT projects that executives 
for who the professional role and functional background experience match are less risk averse and 
associate with more investment decisions than executives without this match. Finally, when 
executives  indicate that they are willing to take risk, given their position in the firm, the percentage 
that the firm invests in R&D is also larger.  
 Naturally, the main limitation of this study is the sample size, but we believe that some 
interesting conclusions could be drawn. The main one seems to be that the differences between 
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risk attitudes of board members of companies in a developing country do not differ tremendously 
from those of board members in developed countries. In addition, compared to developed 
countries, developing countries such as Suriname suffer from limited disclosure of information. 
 Much more future work can be done in this area. Some developing countries are much 
larger than Suriname, and perhaps data collected for those countries can reveal more insights into 
the risk attitudes of board member of firms.  
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Table 1: Answers to the question: “How often were you involved in investment decisions in the 
past 15 years in each of the following areas?” 
 
      Frequency (times) 
Area     Never 1-5 5-10 10-15 >15 
 
Expansion to new markets  2 9 1 0 1 
Expansion of production capacity 1 9 1 0 1 
Innovation or R&D   2 7 2 0 1 
Information technology  4 6 1 1 0 
Mergers and acquisitions  5 8 0 0 0 
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Table 2: Answers to the question: “Which percentage of the annual turnover is usually spent of 
investments in each of the following areas?” 
 
      Percentages 
Area    0-1% 2% 3% 4%   5-10%   11-20%  Not 
                  relevant 
 
Expansion to new markets  1 1 1 1 1 2  4 
Expansion of production capacity 2 1 1 2 3 0  2 
Innovation or R&D   4 2 0 2 1 0  1 
Information technology  3 2 3 1 1 0  1 
Mergers and acquisitions  4 0 0 0 1 1  5 
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Table 3: Judgment of own risk attitude (in our analysis coded by a number ranging from 1 to 10) 
 
 Not willing at all     Willing to a large extent       Average 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
“In general, are you willing to take risk or are you someone who prefers to avoid risk?” 
 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 3 3 0 0 6.08 
 
“Given your position in the firm, are you willing to take risk or are you someone who prefers to 
avoid risk?” 
 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 5 1 0 0 5.62 
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Table 4: Judgment of own risk attitude of types of board members: “Do you think they are willing 
to take risk or are they someone who prefers to avoid risk?” (in our analysis coded by a number 
ranging from 1 to 10) 
 
 Not willing at all     Willing to a large extent 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10      Average 
 
CEO 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 3 1 1 0 5.77 
CFO 0 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 0 0 0 4.46 
NED 0 0 2 2 2 3 2 0 2 0 0 4.69 
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Table 5: Four scenarios in words 
 
Scenario 1 
At a board meeting where the strategy of your firm has been discussed it became apparent that 
expansion is possible using a new marketing channel in another country. Your marketing and sales 
department estimates that the costs are x Mio SRD. If the plan fails, this investment is gone, but 
no other costs are to be expected. It is uncertain whether the new marketing channel really works, 
but the people at the relevant department estimate the success rate as y%. On a scale of 1 (not risky 
at all) to 7 (very risky), how do you estimate this risk of this investment? 
 
Scenario 2 
Your firm considers an investment to increase production. The total amount is x Mio SRD. If it so 
turns out that the investment does not work and production does not increase, then the investment 
amount is lost but no other losses are incurred. The estimate that this project will be successful is 
y%. On a scale of 1 (not risky at all) to 7 (very risky), how do you estimate this risk of this 
investment? 
 
Scenario 3 
The R&D department of your company recommends a new production technique. To see whether 
this technique works, some research has to be done. If the technique fails, the only costs were these 
research costs. Development costs are estimates as x Mio SRD, and the probability that the new 
technique is indeed applicable in your firm is y%. On a scale of 1 (not risky at all) to 7 (very risky), 
how do you estimate this risk of this investment? 
 
Scenario 4 
The IT department of your firm considers the implementation of a new system which in the longer 
term could lead to substantial savings. Costs of this implementation are estimated at x Mio SRD. 
If the new system does not meet its demands, then this investment amount is lost, but no other 
damage is done. The success rate of this project is estimated by the IT department as y%. On a 
scale of 1 (not risky at all) to 7 (very risky), how do you estimate this risk of this investment? 
 
21 
 
Table 6: Four scenarios and four probabilities, the numbers 
 
Scenarios 
1 26000000 31000000 15000000 20000000 
2 20000000 26000000 31000000 15000000 
3 78727200 98409000 59045400 1.18E+08 
4 1.02E+08 76500000 1.28E+08 1.53E+08 
5 8000000 10000000 11000000 6000000 
6 59045400 1.18E+08 78727200 98409000 
7 63000000 52500000 31500000 42000000 
8 54000000 72000000 90000000 1.08E+08 
9 70000000 90000000 1.00E+08 50000000 
10 13200000 26400000 17600000 22000000 
11 98409000 78727200 1.18E+08 59045400 
12 20800000 15600000 26000000 31200000 
13 1.28E+08 1.53E+08 1.02E+08 76500000 
 
Probabilities (%) 
1 85 75 80 70 
2 75 85 90 80 
3 95 80 75 90 
4 80 90 70 95 
5 90 75 85 70 
6 70 80 90 80 
7 75 70 80 85 
8 80 75 90 70 
9 70 80 75 85 
10 75 85 90 70 
11 75 70 80 85 
12 90 70 85 75 
13 70 85 95 75 
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Answers to the questions on risk 
 
1 6 5 3 3 
2 7 6 5 5 
3 2 6 6 6 
4     
5     
6 4 3 6 6 
7 7 7 7 7 
8 5 4 5 5 
9 4 4 5 5 
10     
11  3 3 3 
12 2    
13 6 6 6 6 
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